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Jumping	  to	  conclusions	  about	  the	  beads	  task?	  A	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  delusional	  
ideation	  and	  data-­‐gathering	  
	  It	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  delusional	  and	  delusion-­‐prone	  individuals	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  gather	  less	  data	  before	  forming	  beliefs.	  Most	  of	  the	  evidence	  for	  this	  “jumping	  to	  conclusions”	  (JTC)	  bias	  comes	  from	  studies	  using	  the	  “beads	  task”	  data-­‐gathering	  paradigm.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  JTC	  bias	  is	  mixed.	  We	  conducted	  a	  random-­‐effects	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  individual	  participant	  data	  from	  38	  clinical	  and	  non-­‐clinical	  samples	  (n	  =	  2238)	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  data	  gathering	  in	  the	  beads	  task	  (using	  the	  “draws	  to	  decision”	  measure)	  and	  delusional	  ideation	  (as	  indexed	  by	  the	  “Peters	  et	  al.	  Delusions	  Inventory”;	  PDI).	  We	  found	  that	  delusional	  ideation	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  data	  gathering	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.10,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.17,	  -­‐0.03])	  and	  that	  there	  is	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  estimated	  effect	  sizes	  (Q-­‐stat	  p	  =	  0.03,	  I2	  =	  33).	  Subgroup	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  the	  negative	  association	  was	  present	  when	  considering	  the	  23	  samples	  (n	  =	  1754)	  from	  the	  large	  general	  population	  subgroup	  alone	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.10,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.18,	  -­‐0.02])	  but	  not	  when	  considering	  the	  eight	  samples	  (n	  =	  263)	  from	  the	  small	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  alone	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.13,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.33,	  0.06]).	  These	  results	  provide	  some	  provisional	  support	  for	  continuum	  theories	  of	  psychosis	  and	  for	  cognitive	  models	  that	  implicate	  the	  JTC	  bias	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  delusions.	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Introduction	  
	  In	  a	  now	  classic	  study,	  the	  “beads	  task”1	  was	  adapted	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  delusions	  and	  data-­‐gathering.2	  Participants	  were	  shown	  two	  jars	  of	  beads,	  a	  mostly	  pink	  jar	  (85	  pink	  beads;	  15	  green	  beads)	  and	  a	  mostly	  green	  jar	  (85	  green	  beads;	  15	  pink	  beads).	  The	  jars	  were	  then	  hidden	  and	  participants	  were	  shown	  a	  sequence	  of	  beads	  apparently	  being	  drawn	  from	  one	  of	  the	  two	  jars	  (the	  sequence	  was	  actually	  pre-­‐specified	  by	  the	  experimenter).	  After	  each	  draw	  participants	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  were	  ready	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  about	  which	  jar	  the	  beads	  were	  being	  drawn	  from	  or	  if	  they	  would	  like	  to	  see	  another	  bead.	  This	  study	  found	  that	  people	  with	  delusions	  made	  a	  decision	  about	  which	  jar	  the	  beads	  were	  being	  drawn	  from	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  significantly	  fewer	  beads	  than	  controls.	  This	  study	  has	  inspired	  a	  large	  empirical	  literature,	  and	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  from	  studies	  using	  the	  beads	  task	  paradigm	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  people	  with	  delusions	  show	  a	  JTC	  bias:	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  hypotheses	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  less	  evidence	  than	  non-­‐delusional	  people.3-­‐5	  	  	  	  It	  has	  long	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  positive	  symptoms	  of	  psychosis	  –	  delusions	  and	  hallucinations	  –	  lie	  at	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  a	  continuum	  of	  similar	  subclinical	  phenomena	  in	  the	  general	  population.6-­‐10	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  “psychosis	  continuum”	  is	  supported	  by	  two	  recent	  meta-­‐analyses.11,	  12	  Furthermore,	  it	  has	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been	  argued	  that	  the	  syndrome-­‐based	  diagnostic	  categories	  of	  psychiatry	  impede	  progress	  in	  understanding	  the	  aetiology	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  and	  research	  should	  be	  reoriented	  to	  focus	  on	  vulnerability	  traits	  and	  symptoms	  across	  diagnostic	  categories	  and	  within	  the	  general	  population.13-­‐15	  Notably,	  the	  American	  National	  Institute	  of	  Mental	  Health	  (NIMH)	  has	  recently	  released	  a	  strategic	  plan	  that	  proposes	  abandoning	  syndrome-­‐based	  classifications	  of	  the	  Diagnostics	  and	  Statistical	  Manual	  of	  Mental	  Disorders	  (DSM)	  to	  examine	  “the	  full	  range	  of	  variation,	  from	  normal	  to	  abnormal,	  among	  the	  fundamental	  components	  [dimensions]	  to	  improve	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  typical	  versus	  pathological”.16	  	  A	  dimensional	  approach	  that	  examines	  variation	  in	  the	  general	  population	  could	  provide	  insight	  into	  clinical	  delusions.	  In	  particular,	  evidence	  for	  an	  association	  between	  the	  JTC	  bias	  and	  delusional	  ideation	  in	  the	  general	  population	  would	  provide	  support	  for	  influential	  cognitive	  models	  that	  implicate	  the	  JTC	  bias	  in	  the	  aetiology	  of	  clinical	  delusions.17-­‐23	  The	  PDI24	  is	  by	  far	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  measure	  of	  delusional	  ideation	  in	  the	  beads	  task	  literature.	  The	  PDI	  is	  a	  self-­‐report	  questionnaire	  that	  asks	  people	  if	  they	  have	  ever	  had	  particular	  delusion-­‐like	  experiences.	  For	  example,	  one	  item	  asks,	  “Do	  you	  ever	  feel	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  conspiracy	  against	  you?”	  For	  each	  item	  endorsed	  people	  are	  asked	  to	  rate	  the	  degree	  of	  associated	  distress,	  preoccupation,	  and	  conviction	  separately	  on	  five-­‐point	  Likert	  scales.	  The	  original	  PDI	  has	  40	  items,24	  but	  a	  21-­‐item	  version	  with	  comparable	  psychometric	  properties	  is	  also	  widely	  used.25	  On	  average,	  patients	  diagnosed	  with	  delusions	  report	  higher	  PDI	  scores	  than	  healthy	  controls;24,	  25	  on	  average,	  members	  of	  new	  religious	  movements	  report	  PDI	  scores	  that	  fall	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between	  those	  of	  delusional	  and	  general	  populations;26	  and	  PDI	  scores	  correlate	  moderately	  strongly	  with	  observer-­‐rated	  delusions	  using	  a	  structured	  clinical	  interview.27	  Such	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  PDI	  is	  a	  valid	  measure	  of	  thoughts	  that	  lie	  on	  a	  continuum	  with	  delusional	  beliefs.	  	  Studies	  of	  the	  association	  between	  the	  JTC	  bias	  and	  delusions	  do	  not	  always	  provide	  consistent	  results,	  casting	  doubt	  on	  cognitive	  models	  implicating	  the	  JTC	  bias	  in	  delusion	  formation	  and	  maintenance.	  Consequently,	  careful	  evaluation	  of	  the	  overall	  weight	  of	  evidence	  is	  needed.	  A	  1999	  systematic	  review	  by	  Garety	  and	  Freeman5	  argued	  that	  seven	  of	  eight	  beads	  task	  studies	  provided	  evidence	  that	  the	  JTC	  bias	  is	  associated	  with	  delusions.	  A	  2013	  follow-­‐up	  by	  Garety	  and	  Freeman4	  reviewed	  53	  new	  beads	  task	  studies	  (and	  8	  studies	  using	  other	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  tasks)	  and	  concluded	  that	  “the	  clear	  majority	  of	  these	  studies...	  confirmed	  that	  JTC	  is	  characteristic	  of	  people	  with	  delusions”	  (p.	  328).	  Although	  this	  “vote	  counting”	  approach	  is	  commonly	  employed	  in	  systematic	  reviews,	  it	  is	  known	  to	  have	  significant	  limitations.28,	  29	  First,	  it	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  features	  of	  studies	  (such	  as	  sample	  size)	  that	  ought	  to	  result	  in	  some	  studies	  being	  weighed	  more	  heavily	  than	  others.	  Second,	  it	  does	  not	  test	  or	  control	  for	  publication	  bias,	  selective	  reporting	  bias,	  or	  other	  biases	  that	  can	  inflate	  the	  evidence	  for	  an	  effect.	  Third,	  it	  does	  not	  quantify	  effect	  sizes.	  
The	  limitations	  of	  systematic	  reviews	  make	  meta-­‐analysis	  a	  crucial	  tool	  for	  integrating	  evidence	  across	  studies.29-­‐32	  A	  2007	  meta-­‐analysis	  by	  Fine	  et	  al.3	  examined	  12	  studies.	  They	  found	  that	  one	  measure	  of	  the	  JTC	  bias	  reached	  statistical	  significance	  (“draws	  to	  decision”),	  but	  another	  three	  measures	  did	  not.	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Although	  useful,	  this	  meta-­‐analysis	  has	  limitations.	  First,	  it	  used	  multiple	  effect	  sizes	  from	  the	  same	  samples	  (47	  effect	  sizes	  from	  22	  samples)	  to	  estimate	  a	  single	  underlying	  construct	  (the	  JTC	  bias),	  which	  violates	  the	  assumption	  of	  statistical	  independence.29,	  32	  Second,	  the	  Stouffer	  method	  of	  meta-­‐analysis	  was	  used,33	  which	  makes	  the	  problematic	  assumption	  that	  all	  studies	  are	  sampled	  from	  a	  single	  population.29	  Third,	  the	  possibility	  of	  publication	  bias	  and	  selective	  reporting	  bias	  was	  not	  examined.	  Fourth,	  effect	  sizes	  were	  not	  quantified.	  	  	  Taylor	  et	  al.34	  recently	  pre-­‐registered	  a	  rationale	  and	  protocol	  for	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  that	  will	  examine	  whether	  the	  JTC	  bias	  is	  associated	  with	  clinical	  delusions.	  This	  protocol	  is	  methodologically	  sophisticated	  and	  promises	  to	  address	  limitations	  of	  the	  earlier	  systematic	  reviews	  and	  meta-­‐analysis.	  Nevertheless,	  because	  this	  protocol	  focuses	  on	  between-­‐group	  differences	  it	  will	  not	  speak	  directly	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  delusions	  lie	  at	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  a	  continuum	  of	  subclinical	  phenomena	  within	  the	  general	  population.6-­‐12	  	  	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  questionable	  research	  practices	  are	  prevalent	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  and	  an	  anonymous	  survey	  suggests	  that	  selective	  reporting	  of	  results	  is	  particularly	  widespread.35	  Selective	  reporting	  bias	  can	  result	  in	  false-­‐positives	  well	  above	  the	  nominal	  rate	  of	  5%,36	  even	  when	  researchers	  strive	  to	  report	  their	  results	  dispassionately	  and	  honestly.37	  Selective	  reporting	  bias	  can	  be	  curtailed	  by	  direct	  replication	  of	  experiments,	  ideally	  with	  preregistered	  protocols,	  and	  open	  access	  to	  raw	  data.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  value	  placed	  on	  innovation	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  direct	  replication	  is	  extremely	  rare.38	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  beads	  task	  literature	  fits	  the	  typical	  profile	  of	  social	  science	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research.	  We	  were	  unable	  to	  identify	  any	  beads	  task	  study	  that	  directly	  replicated	  an	  earlier	  study,	  or	  used	  a	  pre-­‐registered	  protocol,	  or	  provided	  open	  access	  to	  raw	  data.	  Consequently	  there	  is	  considerable	  scope	  for	  selective	  reporting	  bias.	  	  
In	  the	  present	  meta-­‐analysis	  we	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  delusional	  ideation	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  data-­‐gathering	  in	  the	  general	  population	  and	  clinical	  populations.	  We	  did	  not	  use	  the	  effect	  sizes	  reported	  in	  publications.	  Instead	  we	  acquired	  raw	  data	  for	  each	  study	  that	  met	  our	  inclusion	  criteria	  and	  calculated	  the	  precise	  effect	  size	  of	  interest	  for	  each	  sample:	  the	  association	  between	  draws	  to	  decision	  on	  the	  beads	  task	  and	  PDI	  scores.	  This	  “individual	  participant	  data”	  approach	  offers	  numerous	  advantages	  over	  conventional	  meta-­‐analysis	  and	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  “gold	  standard”	  of	  systematic	  review.39-­‐41	  Two	  advantages	  are	  particularly	  salient	  when	  considering	  the	  beads	  task	  literature.	  First,	  beads	  task	  studies	  typically	  report	  differences	  between	  samples	  only.	  That	  is,	  variation	  
within	  delusional	  samples	  and	  within	  non-­‐delusional	  samples,	  which	  is	  crucial	  for	  testing	  continuum	  models,	  is	  rarely	  reported.	  Using	  individual	  participant	  data	  we	  were	  able	  to	  examine	  this	  crucial,	  but	  neglected,	  variation.	  Second,	  by	  consistently	  applying	  the	  same	  screening	  criteria	  and	  statistical	  tests	  to	  samples	  from	  different	  studies	  we	  were	  able	  to	  circumvent	  selective	  reporting	  bias	  and	  related	  biases.	  
Methods	  	  
Search	  strategy	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We	  used	  two	  strategies	  for	  identifying	  studies	  for	  possible	  inclusion	  in	  our	  meta-­‐analysis.	  First,	  we	  assessed	  for	  eligibility	  studies	  tabulated	  in	  the	  2013	  systematic	  review	  by	  Garety	  and	  Freeman.4	  They	  reported	  using	  three	  search	  techniques.	  First,	  they	  searched	  the	  Web	  of	  Science	  and	  PubMed	  databases	  using	  the	  following	  search	  terms:	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  AND	  “delusions”,	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  AND	  “schizophrenia”;	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  AND	  “psychosis”;	  “jump	  to	  conclusions”	  AND	  “paranoia”.	  Second,	  they	  consulted	  five	  widely	  cited	  review	  articles	  on	  delusions.3,	  5,	  22,	  42,	  43	  Third,	  they	  manually	  searched	  “early	  view”	  articles	  in	  the	  journals	  Schizophrenia	  Bulletin,	  Schizophrenia	  Research,	  
British	  Journal	  of	  Clinical	  Psychology,	  Behaviour	  Research	  and	  Therapy,	  Journal	  of	  
Behavioural	  Research	  and	  Experimental	  Psychiatry,	  Psychological	  Medicine,	  and	  
Journal	  of	  Abnormal	  Psychology.	  In	  addition,	  we	  searched	  for	  articles	  published	  from	  2011	  to	  the	  present	  and	  “early	  view”	  articles	  using	  the	  same	  search	  techniques	  as	  Garety	  and	  Freeman4	  to	  identify	  studies	  that	  might	  have	  been	  published	  after	  they	  completed	  their	  search.	  	  	  Second,	  we	  used	  Google	  Scholar’s	  cited	  reference	  search	  functionality	  to	  identify	  studies	  that	  had	  cited	  the	  paper	  that	  introduced	  the	  40-­‐item	  PDI24	  or	  the	  21-­‐item	  PDI	  from	  2011	  to	  the	  present.25	  Of	  the	  papers	  identified	  by	  Google	  Scholar,	  we	  inspected	  for	  possible	  inclusion	  those	  papers	  that	  had	  titles	  that	  indicated	  that	  they	  might	  include	  the	  beads	  task.	  Our	  literature	  search	  was	  completed	  July	  10,	  2014,	  and	  is	  inclusive	  of	  studies	  published	  up	  to	  that	  date.	  	  
Inclusion	  criteria	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We	  categorised	  studies	  as	  eligible	  for	  inclusion	  in	  our	  meta-­‐analysis	  if	  they	  met	  two	  inclusion	  criteria.	  First,	  the	  study	  used	  either	  a	  40-­‐item	  or	  21-­‐item	  PDI.	  We	  included	  all	  studies	  that	  used	  a	  PDI,	  even	  if	  the	  PDI	  had	  been	  modified.	  This	  meant	  that	  we	  included	  one	  study	  that	  used	  a	  version	  of	  the	  PDI	  that	  measured	  preoccupation	  only44	  and	  three	  studies	  that	  did	  not	  use	  the	  three	  PDI	  subscales	  but	  used	  only	  the	  initial	  “yes/no”	  question.45-­‐47	  Second,	  the	  study	  used	  a	  standard	  two	  jar	  draws	  to	  decision	  version	  of	  the	  beads	  task.	  We	  did	  not	  include	  studies	  that	  used	  “beads	  task-­‐like”	  data-­‐gathering	  paradigms	  (such	  as	  “emotional	  beads	  task”	  or	  “fishing	  task”	  paradigms)	  because	  we	  wanted	  studies	  to	  be	  as	  directly	  comparable	  as	  possible.	  	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  delusion	  ideation	  across	  syndrome-­‐based	  diagnostic	  categories,	  so	  we	  did	  not	  exclude	  clinical	  groups	  that	  did	  not	  have	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  schizophrenia.	  We	  emailed	  the	  authors	  of	  all	  eligible	  studies	  with	  a	  request	  for	  raw	  data	  from	  their	  published	  and	  unpublished	  studies.	  We	  succeeded	  in	  sourcing	  raw	  data	  for	  all	  eligible	  published	  studies	  (bar	  one48)	  and	  one	  currently	  unpublished	  study.49	  All	  studies	  we	  sourced	  that	  met	  our	  two	  inclusion	  criteria	  were	  included	  in	  the	  meta-­‐analysis.	  	  
Data	  coding	  	  When	  possible,	  we	  calculated	  total	  PDI	  scores	  for	  each	  participant	  by	  adding	  the	  number	  of	  “yes”	  responses	  to	  scores	  from	  the	  three	  subscales.	  This	  was	  possible	  for	  27	  samples	  (see	  Table	  1	  for	  exceptions).	  Twenty-­‐five	  samples	  were	  tested	  using	  the	  21-­‐item	  PDI44-­‐46,	  49-­‐60	  and	  13	  using	  the	  40-­‐item	  PDI.47,	  61-­‐66	  When	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calculating	  total	  PDI	  scores	  for	  samples	  that	  used	  the	  40-­‐item	  PDI,	  we	  included	  only	  those	  21	  items	  that	  appear	  in	  the	  21-­‐item	  PDI.	  Raw	  data	  obtained	  for	  six	  samples	  that	  used	  the	  40-­‐item	  PDI	  did	  not	  include	  scores	  for	  individual	  items;47,	  
61	  in	  these	  cases	  we	  used	  the	  total	  PDI	  score	  for	  all	  40	  items.	  Eight	  samples	  used	  a	  version	  of	  the	  PDI	  that	  did	  not	  include	  the	  subscales;45-­‐47	  in	  these	  cases	  we	  used	  the	  number	  of	  “Yes”	  responses	  to	  the	  initial	  questions	  alone	  to	  calculate	  the	  PDI	  total	  score.	  For	  the	  sample	  that	  used	  a	  version	  of	  the	  PDI	  that	  measured	  preoccupation	  only,44	  we	  used	  the	  preoccupation	  score	  alone	  to	  calculate	  the	  PDI	  total	  score.	  	  Samples	  varied	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  beads	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  request	  before	  making	  a	  decision	  about	  which	  jar	  the	  beads	  were	  being	  drawn	  from.	  Participants	  were	  not	  told	  what	  this	  limit	  was.	  If	  they	  reached	  this	  limit	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  make	  a	  decision.	  Following	  standard	  practice,	  we	  retained	  data	  from	  participants	  who	  reached	  the	  limit.	  Samples	  also	  varied	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  number	  of	  beads	  task	  trials	  presented	  to	  participants.	  For	  analysis,	  we	  calculated	  a	  mean	  draws	  to	  decision	  score	  across	  trials	  for	  each	  participant.	  We	  coded	  beads	  task	  trials	  with	  a	  ratio	  of	  beads	  of	  60:40	  as	  “difficult”	  and	  beads	  task	  trials	  with	  ratios	  of	  beads	  of	  either	  85:15	  or	  80:20	  as	  “easy”,	  which	  we	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  percentage	  of	  trials	  that	  were	  “easy”	  for	  each	  sample.	  	  	  Inspection	  of	  raw	  data	  occasionally	  revealed	  instances	  of	  typographic	  errors.	  When	  we	  identified	  such	  errors	  we	  attempted	  to	  infer	  correct	  values.	  When	  this	  was	  not	  possible	  we	  recoded	  erroneous	  values	  as	  missing	  data.	  Participants	  who	  had	  missing	  data	  for	  PDI	  score,	  draws	  to	  decision,	  age,	  or	  gender	  were	  removed	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prior	  to	  analysis.	  The	  single	  exception	  was	  the	  study	  by	  Broome	  et	  al.61	  that	  did	  not	  code	  for	  gender;	  we	  included	  participants	  from	  this	  study	  in	  all	  analyses	  that	  did	  not	  include	  gender	  as	  a	  variable.	  In	  total,	  58	  participants	  (2.5%	  of	  participants)	  were	  removed	  due	  to	  missing	  data.	  	  	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Table	  1	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Characteristics	  of	  samples	  included	  in	  the	  meta-­‐analysis.	  N/A	  =	  Information	  not	  available;	  OCD	  =	  Obsessive-­‐Compulsive	  Disorder;	  NRM	  =	  New	  Religious	  Movement;	  Note	  1	  =	  40-­‐item	  PDI;	  for	  total	  PDI	  score;	  Note	  2	  =	  Initial	  "Yes/No"	  question	  for	  total	  PDI	  score;	  Note	  3	  =	  preoccupation	  for	  total	  PDI	  score.	  	  
Statistical	  Analysis	  	  Inspection	  of	  PDI	  scores	  and	  mean	  draws	  to	  decision	  revealed	  that	  neither	  variable	  was	  normally	  distributed,	  so	  we	  used	  the	  non-­‐parametric	  Spearman’s	  rank	  correlation	  coefficient	  (rs)	  for	  analysis.	  As	  per	  the	  method	  advocated	  by	  Hedges	  and	  Olkin,31	  we	  converted	  rs	  scores	  to	  their	  associated	  Fisher’s	  z-­‐scores	  for	  estimating	  uncertainty	  in	  effect	  sizes	  and	  back-­‐transformed	  Fisher’s	  z-­‐scores	  to	  rs	  scores	  for	  interpretation.	  	  	  Meta-­‐analysis	  was	  conducted	  using	  the	  software	  OpenMEE67,	  68	  and	  the	  R	  package	  Metafor.69,	  70	  We	  used	  a	  random	  effects	  model30,	  32	  and	  examined	  heterogeneity	  in	  estimates	  of	  rs	  for	  the	  overall	  group	  of	  samples	  and	  diagnostic	  subgroups	  using	  the	  Q	  statistic71	  and	  the	  I2	  index.72	  The	  Q	  statistic	  can	  be	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underpowered,73	  so	  we	  paid	  some	  attention	  to	  I2	  indices	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  non-­‐significant	  Q	  statistics.	  We	  used	  the	  Sidik–Jonkman	  method	  for	  estimating	  heterogeneity	  because	  it	  provides	  more	  accurate	  estimates	  than	  the	  more	  widely	  used	  DerSimonian–Laird	  method.74	  To	  examine	  potential	  moderators	  of	  effect	  sizes,	  we	  used	  random-­‐effects	  meta-­‐regression75	  with	  a	  separate	  meta-­‐regression	  for	  each	  potential	  moderator.	  We	  assessed	  the	  evidence	  for	  publication	  bias	  using	  a	  funnel	  plot	  and	  Egger’s	  regression	  test	  for	  funnel	  plot	  asymmetry.76,	  77	  	  
Results	  	  
Meta-­‐analysis	  	  Figure	  1	  shows	  a	  forest	  plot	  for	  the	  random-­‐effects	  meta-­‐analysis.	  The	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  association	  between	  draws	  to	  decision	  and	  PDI	  score	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.10,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.17,	  -­‐0.03],	  n	  =	  2238,	  k	  =	  38)(see	  the	  dark	  grey	  diamond,	  Figure	  1).	  We	  found	  moderate	  heterogeneity	  (Q-­‐stat	  p	  =	  0.03,	  I2	  =	  33),	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  precise	  magnitude	  of	  the	  overall	  effect	  size	  should	  be	  interpreted	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  caution.	  	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Figure	  1	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  
Figure	  1.	  Forest	  plot	  of	  random	  effects	  meta-­‐analysis	  showing	  effect	  sizes	  (rs)	  for	  the	  association	  between	  draws	  to	  decision	  and	  PDI.	  The	  black	  squares	  show	  effect	  sizes	  for	  each	  sample	  and	  are	  drawn	  proportional	  to	  the	  relative	  weighting	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of	  each	  sample	  in	  the	  analysis.	  The	  error	  bars	  show	  the	  95%	  CI	  for	  each	  sample.	  The	  dark	  grey	  diamond	  shows	  the	  overall	  95%	  CI.	  The	  light	  grey	  diamonds	  show	  the	  95%	  CI	  for	  each	  subgroup.	  The	  broken	  line	  shows	  the	  overall	  mean	  effect	  size	  estimate.	  	  	  
Subgroup	  analysis	  	  We	  found	  a	  negative	  association	  between	  draws	  to	  decision	  and	  PDI	  when	  considering	  the	  general	  population	  subgroup	  alone	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.10,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.18,	  -­‐0.02],	  n	  =	  1754,	  k	  =	  23),	  but	  not	  in	  the	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  alone	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.13,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.33,	  0.06],	  n	  =	  263,	  k	  =	  8),	  the	  previous	  delusions	  subgroup	  alone	  (rs	  =	  0.02,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.61,	  0.65],	  n	  =	  54,	  k	  =	  2),	  or	  the	  anxiety	  or	  depression	  subgroup	  alone	  (rs	  =	  -­‐0.07,	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.30,	  0.17],	  n	  =	  76,	  k	  =	  2)(see	  respective	  light	  grey	  diamonds,	  Figure	  1).	  	  We	  found	  moderate	  heterogeneity	  within	  the	  general	  population	  subgroup	  (Q-­‐stat	  p	  =	  0.04,	  I2	  =	  37)	  and	  substantial	  heterogeneity	  within	  the	  previous	  delusions	  subgroup	  (Q-­‐stat	  p	  =	  0.02,	  I2	  =	  82),	  but	  we	  did	  not	  find	  statistically	  significant	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  (Q-­‐stat	  p	  =	  0.08,	  I2	  =	  44)	  or	  the	  anxiety	  or	  depression	  subgroup	  (Q-­‐stat	  p	  =	  0.68,	  I2	  =	  0).	  	  	  
Meta-­‐regression	  	  Because	  there	  was	  evidence	  for	  moderate	  heterogeneity	  we	  performed	  exploratory	  moderator	  analysis.	  Figure	  2	  shows	  that	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  was	  a	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statistically	  significant	  predictor	  of	  rs	  (β	  =	  0.07,	  SE	  =	  0.02;	  95%	  CI	  [0.02,	  0.11];	  z	  =	  3.00,	  p	  <	  0.01;	  α	  =	  -­‐0.26;	  SE	  =	  0.06;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.38,	  -­‐0.14];	  z	  =	  -­‐4.10,	  p	  <	  0.01).	  Visual	  inspection	  of	  Figure	  2	  suggests	  that	  the	  three	  samples	  that	  had	  six	  trials	  (all	  of	  which	  came	  from	  the	  same	  study)	  might	  have	  had	  a	  large	  influence	  on	  the	  regression.	  To	  test	  the	  robustness	  of	  this	  association	  we	  re-­‐ran	  the	  meta-­‐regression	  with	  these	  three	  samples	  removed	  and	  found	  that	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  statistically	  significant	  predictor	  of	  rs	  (β	  =	  0.06,	  SE	  =	  0.03;	  95%	  CI	  [0.00,	  0.13];	  z	  =	  1.89,	  p	  =	  0.06;	  α	  =	  -­‐0.25;	  SE	  =	  0.08;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.40,	  -­‐0.10];	  
z	  =	  -­‐3.26,	  p	  <	  0.01),	  which	  suggests	  that	  some	  caution	  is	  warranted	  when	  interpreting	  this	  association.	  	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Figure	  2	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Regression	  plot	  showing	  the	  random-­‐effects	  meta-­‐regression	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  number	  of	  beads	  task	  trials	  and	  effect	  sizes.	  Effect	  sizes	  (rs)	  are	  plotted	  as	  circles	  with	  the	  size	  of	  the	  circles	  drawn	  proportional	  to	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  the	  sample	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  	  Other	  potential	  moderators	  were	  not	  found	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  predictors	  of	  effect	  size:	  average	  age	  of	  participants	  in	  a	  sample	  (β	  =	  0.00,	  SE	  =	  0.00;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.01,	  0.01];	  z	  =	  -­‐0.60,	  p	  =	  0.55;	  α	  =	  -­‐0.04;	  SE	  =	  0.11;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.25,	  0.18];	  z	  =	  -­‐0.33,	  p	  =	  0.74);	  percentage	  of	  females	  in	  a	  sample	  (male	  =	  0;	  female	  =	  1)(β	  =	  0.19,	  SE	  =	  0.20;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.20,	  0.58];	  z	  =	  0.95,	  p	  =	  0.34;	  α	  =	  -­‐0.20;	  SE	  =	  0.12;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.43,	  0.03];	  z	  =	  -­‐1.73,	  p	  =	  0.08);	  and	  percentage	  of	  trails	  that	  used	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the	  easy	  version	  of	  the	  beads	  task	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.10,	  SE	  =	  0.09;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.28,	  0.09];	  z	  =	  -­‐1.03,	  p	  =	  0.30;	  α	  =	  -­‐0.05;	  SE	  =	  0.06;	  95%	  CI	  [-­‐0.17,	  0.07];	  z	  =	  -­‐0.77,	  p	  =	  0.44).	  	  	  	  
Publication	  bias	  	  Figure	  3	  shows	  a	  funnel	  plot.	  A	  negative	  effect	  size	  is	  predicted,	  so	  publication	  bias	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  manifest	  as	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  region	  of	  the	  funnel	  plot.	  There	  is	  no	  obvious	  gap	  here	  or	  elsewhere.	  In	  addition,	  the	  plot	  appears	  to	  be	  relatively	  symmetric	  and	  Egger’s	  regression	  test	  for	  funnel	  plot	  asymmetry	  was	  non-­‐significant	  (z	  =	  -­‐0.7705,	  p	  =	  0.441).	  Overall,	  we	  found	  no	  evidence	  for	  publication	  bias.	  Nevertheless,	  absence	  of	  evidence	  should	  be	  interpreted	  with	  some	  caution,	  because	  even	  when	  publication	  bias	  is	  present	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  identify.77,	  78	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Insert	  Figure	  3	  about	  here	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Figure	  3.	  Funnel	  plot	  showing	  effect	  size	  (rs)	  plotted	  against	  standard	  error.	  	  
Discussion	  	  
Summary	  of	  findings	  	  	  Overall,	  these	  results	  indicate	  that	  people	  with	  higher	  PDI	  scores	  tend	  to	  request	  fewer	  beads	  before	  making	  a	  decision	  about	  which	  jar	  beads	  are	  being	  drawn	  from	  than	  people	  with	  lower	  PDI	  scores.	  The	  overall	  effect	  size	  was	  small,	  and	  exhibited	  moderate	  heterogeneity.	  This	  negative	  association	  between	  PDI	  scores	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and	  draws	  to	  decision	  was	  present	  when	  considering	  the	  general	  population	  subgroup	  alone,	  but	  not	  when	  considering	  the	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  alone.	  We	  found	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  effect	  size	  estimates	  had	  been	  inflated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  publication	  bias.	  	  	  
Discussion	  of	  findings	  	  Overall,	  these	  results	  provide	  some	  provisional	  support	  for	  continuum	  theories	  of	  psychosis6-­‐12	  and	  for	  cognitive	  models	  that	  implicate	  the	  JTC	  bias	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  delusions.17-­‐23	  That	  we	  did	  not	  find	  evidence	  for	  an	  association	  in	  the	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  concern,	  as	  cognitive	  theories	  aim	  to	  account	  for	  clinical	  delusions	  not	  mere	  delusional	  ideation	  in	  the	  general	  population.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  Figure	  1	  shows,	  the	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  the	  general	  population	  subgroup	  and	  the	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  overlap	  substantially	  and	  have	  almost	  identical	  means	  (in	  fact,	  the	  mean	  for	  the	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  is	  slightly	  more	  negative).	  We	  suggest	  that	  the	  low	  statistical	  power	  of	  subgroup	  analysis29	  is	  a	  more	  plausible	  interpretation	  of	  this	  counter-­‐intuitive	  result	  than	  proposing	  that	  the	  association	  	  is	  present	  in	  the	  large	  general	  population	  subgroup	  (n	  =	  1754)	  but	  not	  the	  much	  smaller	  current	  delusions	  subgroup	  (n	  =	  263).	  	  	  Although	  these	  results	  provide	  evidence	  for	  an	  association	  between	  delusional	  ideation	  and	  data	  gathering,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  small	  effect	  sizes.	  One	  possible	  interpretation	  of	  the	  small	  effect	  sizes	  is	  that	  the	  JTC	  bias	  plays	  only	  a	  minor	  role	  in	  delusion	  formation	  and	  maintenance,	  despite	  the	  many	  published	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studies	  reporting	  that	  the	  JTC	  bias	  is	  more	  common	  in	  those	  with	  current	  delusions	  than	  controls.4,	  5	  It	  may	  even	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  JTC	  bias	  would	  explain	  no	  additional	  variation	  if	  other	  important	  factors	  were	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  This	  possibility	  is	  consistent	  with	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  beads	  task	  studies	  included	  in	  our	  meta-­‐analysis,	  which	  found	  no	  evidence	  for	  an	  association	  between	  paranoia	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  paranoid	  delusions)	  and	  jumping	  to	  conclusions	  when	  controlling	  for	  the	  association	  between	  paranoia	  and	  general	  cognitive	  performance.47	  We	  anticipate	  that	  the	  upcoming	  meta-­‐analysis	  by	  Taylor	  et	  al.34	  will	  help	  clarify	  as	  they	  will	  quantify	  differences	  in	  data-­‐gathering	  between	  groups	  with	  delusions	  and	  control	  groups,	  while	  exploring	  a	  variety	  of	  potential	  moderating	  variables.	  	  Another	  possible	  interpretation	  of	  these	  small	  effect	  sizes	  is	  that	  the	  beads	  task	  might	  not	  be	  a	  very	  good	  task	  for	  examining	  the	  JTC	  bias.	  This	  possibility	  is	  supported	  by	  claims	  that	  studies	  that	  have	  used	  the	  beads	  task	  may	  have	  had	  significant	  methodological	  limitations.	  First,	  if	  a	  participant	  asks	  to	  see	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  beads	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  that	  they	  are	  jumping	  to	  conclusions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  insufficient	  evidence.79	  In	  many	  instances,	  very	  few	  beads	  need	  to	  be	  drawn	  for	  the	  posterior	  probability	  of	  one	  of	  the	  jars	  to	  be	  very	  high	  (e.g.,	  when	  the	  ratio	  of	  colours	  is	  85:15	  and	  the	  first	  two	  beads	  are	  the	  same	  colour,	  the	  posterior	  probability	  of	  the	  corresponding	  jar	  is	  0.97).	  Second,	  evidence	  from	  a	  “graded	  estimates”	  variant	  of	  the	  beads	  task	  suggests	  that	  people	  with	  delusions	  misunderstand	  task	  instructions	  more	  often	  than	  controls.80	  Third,	  the	  beads	  task	  is	  rarely	  incentivised	  and	  motivation	  might	  partially	  explain	  differences	  in	  performance.81,	  82	  We	  suggest	  that	  investigating	  between-­‐group	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differences	  in	  beads	  task	  performance	  using	  meta-­‐analysis,34	  exploring	  new	  data-­‐gathering	  paradigms	  that	  might	  overcome	  methodological	  limitations	  of	  the	  beads	  task,81-­‐87	  examining	  exactly	  when	  participants	  stop	  drawing	  beads,88	  controlling	  for	  important	  aspects	  of	  individual	  variation,47	  and	  revisiting	  the	  original	  –	  and	  methodologically	  sophisticated	  –	  beads	  task	  paradigm1	  could	  help	  clarify	  whether	  the	  JTC	  bias	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  delusions.	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